Comment 2 - at least partial fulfilment of part 13 (England for the Saxons only) of the Anonymous Prophecy of Mount Athos of 1053 and article The Brexit Religion and the Holy Grail of the NHS” Original link required for citation of the paper “ The Brexit Religion and the Holy Grail of the NHS”, which now follows below: : https://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/138706/1/WRAP-The-Brexit-Religion-Holy-Grail-of-the-NHS-Kettell-2020.pdf For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk.
Original link required for citation of the paper “ The Brexit Religion and the Holy Grail of the NHS”, which now follows below:
: https://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/138706/1/WRAP-The-Brexit-Religion-Holy-Grail-of-the-NHS-Kettell-2020.pdf
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk.
Comment 2 - at least partial fulfilment of part 13 (England for the Saxons only) of the Anonymous Prophecy of Mount Athos of 1053 and article The Brexit Religion and the Holy Grail of the NHS” (with Scribd Article inserted)
This is an attempt to direct, directly to academics, the need to understand that the most accurate predictor of what will happen, including in the case of the UK and Gibraltar leaving the EU, is Orthodox Christian prophecy. It´s high time that it was paid attention to.
Technical note: I am nothing to do with Warwick University and am writing this in a personal capacity as an informed True Orthodox Christian layman. I voted to Remain in the Referendum, without hesitation, and am expressing what are for now theologoumena – individual theological opinions in areas where no clear Patristic consensus (aka symphony) has yet emerged.
Nevertheless, I start from first principles: the greatest of all the commandments, Christ said, are to love God, and to love thine neighbour (as [much as if not more than] thyself). The European Union countries are quite literally the geographical neighbours of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (the UK) and (the UK overseas territory of (the British Crown Colony of) Gibraltar, and the only land border the UK has is with Eire, the Irish Republic, which remains a European Union (EU) member state. Gibraltar has a land border with Spain, another EU member state.
Leaving the EU, with all the hostility involved and the exclusion of the direct input of the UK and Gibraltar´s neighbours into what had been common laws made by members of the EU, is a hostile anti-neighbourly act, and is, therefore, fundamentally anti-Christian, in my view, working from first principles.
More than that, supporting this exit, in any form whatsoever, is, in my view, phyletist. Phyletism is the heresy of putting a nation above God and was formalized by a local council of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople in a ruling against Bulgarian nationalists in the 19th century.
Thus, in my view the UK and Gibraltar leaving the EU as fundamentally anti-Christian.
However, it should be noted that many, if not, most probably, most, or even very nearly all, Christians (especially of the less nominal sort) tend to be very right wing and amongst such people it has been found that they are maybe up to 9 times as likely to have voted to leave the EU than to Remain. Those of us who hold some values which might be described, conventionally, as ultra-conservative or ultra-traditional (I´m an abortion abolitionist, if admittedly somewhat moderate compared to the vast majority of abolitionists who advocate the death penalty for those who abort the unborn, as I would prefer the loving approach of compulsory education, followed by community work and mental health treatment as we want to bring them to repentance) were thus much more likely to vote Leave in the Referendum) and I am thus in the 10% who hold some traditional values (but support income redistribution, progressive taxation, etc) and who might be described, by some, as likely to be “Blue Labour” who supported Remain. Most “Blue Labour” types come from and identify as “working class”. I am very rare in coming from a cosmopolitan upper middle class background (with ancestors everything from pre-Conquest [and therefore True Orthodox Christian, not Papal Protestant or Reformed Protestant] royalty (and thus far more genuinely royal than the Normano-Hanoverian “royals”, descended from the Papal Protestant Romanist heretic William the Bastard, illegitimate by name and nature and his own choice) – through to extremely poor shoeless ancestors. I´m thus in a small minority of Remain voters, who mirror a small minority of socially left-wing Leave voters.
As ever, [True] Orthodox Christian Prophecy is completely accurate.
As modestly noted here by another commentator:
He gives a link to his well-argued view on the Orthodox Christian way of understanding prophecy, which differs from many others within his comment on the superiority of Orthodox Christian prophecy to all other prophecy:
https://old.reddit.com/r/DebateReligion/comments/174tvtz/orthodoxy_on_divine_hiddenness/
Orthodoxy on Divine Hiddenness
Note: For some reason with every debate I've made here I have to clarify this, but this debate is not about the truth or falsity of Christianity or God and I will not debate or respond to such arguments. Just because you disagree with the presuppositions behind my position does not mean that that is what the debate is about. This debate is specifically about my rebuttal to divine hiddenness arguments and the coherency of my position on the topic, and nothing else.
On Knowledge of God
So many people argue about how everyone should have knowledge of God, or that it is unfair to be born somewhere without access to knowledge of God.
God doesn't send people to heaven or hell based upon adherence to truth claims. Someone's level of rational knowledge about God is not the most important thing he wants of us.
Salvation is based upon ones noetic love for God. Part of that spiritual love can be found in both the practical faith and believing in the truth of God, and part of that love can be found in doing good deeds, but faith alone cannot save you, and works alone are dead. Faith and works only save through love.
While having the true faith is good, it is also a huge responsibility and challenge. While i wouldn't go so far as Jews do with their Tribal belief, I would say that Christianity is still also a kind of tribal community with special responsibilities. Except it is a spiritually based tribe rather than one based on an ethno-states covenant, and they are responsibilities and rules based on personal faith, rather than being able to be done by Atheist jews as in Judaism and thus irrelevant to ones faith.
Orthodoxy is not merely a moral or legal covenant and salvation is not merely from moral obligations, but salvation is ontological. God became man so that man could become god. Therefore, the responsibility one has in Orthodoxy is towards Theosis, to make real ontological spiritual change into being another kind of being. Salvation is the same thing as becoming God, and God is the same thing as love. Thus to be saved is to become embodied love. Truth is an outpouring of love, not its origin.
A common saying in Orthodoxy is that the road to hell is paved with the skulls of priests and lit with the skulls of bishops. Another common idea is that it is far more damning for one's soul if they enter the church and believe, only to fall away later, then if they were never to have come to the faith in the first place.
There is a tale in Orthodoxy about a monk who tried to correct the false beliefs of a simple farmer who put out milk for God to drink by showing him it was a fox and trying to instead teach him about God as an invisible spirit, but the man could not understand his logic, and an angel appeared later to chastise him for turning the man away from true faith and love for God due to his higher learning.
God saves people in their level of knowledge and their position in the world. He does not want to heap unnecessary burdens upon people. All throughout the Bible it talks about the true faith being simple, for children, foolish and crazy to the learned men of the world.
Ignorance can be an excuse, a reason to help people be saved when they might otherwise not be. And God gives it to them, and sends a spirit of delusion to both wicked and righteous. But sometimes knowledge can save, and thus then he gives it to them. But also knowledge can damn someone, for if someone is not prepared for it or misuses the responsibility given by that knowledge, they can be one of those lampposts on the road to hell. So sometimes God brings knowledge to save people who need it, and sometimes gives knowledge to the wicked in order to judge them.
There is no universal standard of God's method of salvation, besides being mystically united to Orthodoxy.
Some people will be better saved through knowledge, and some better saved through ignorance. But Orthodoxy is the only way to salvation, because the Orthodox God who is love itself is the only way to salvation, and as such, even if God cannot get someone to Orthodoxy, he will try to get them as close as possible to it.
Love comes before truth.
On Preparation for God
Another important belief is that in Orthodoxy heaven and hell are the same exact fire, and that fire is God and his loving presence. There is so much throughout the old and new testament about spiritual preparation, and how if you do not prepare yourself, you will burn and die when you face God. Even the high priest would only enter the holy of holies one day a year. Having "strange fire" in worship will kill you when faced with the true fire.
God doesn't want to give a huge sign and miracle to show everyone that he is real; then the end times would come. It would literally kill everyone to see God's love. That is how infinitely powerful and overwhelming his love is. (And why would we expect anything less from God?) God holds himself back in his mercy.
In revelations it speaks of heaven and earth being remade with fire. That is what will happen if God removes the veil of heaven.
Imagine Christianity is true; We are then clearly in a Time likened to Sodom and Gomorrah in how sinful and fallen away from Christ the world is. Why has fire and brimstone not destroyed everything? Due to the righteous men in the "city" who are praying for God's mercy and for the people to repent.
Even if we do not consider God's fire, there is still reason for God to stay hidden. In the Creed, Orthodox pray "I shall not reveal thine mysteries to thine enemies, and neither like Judas will I give thee a kiss, but like the thief will I confess thee".
God does not reveal his mysteries to his enemies. Miracles are given to the faithful, not to the wicked. Someone wicked who converts due to a true miracle, such as Saul, is due to them actually having a seed of loving faith within them, such that even though they are an enemy, they are not an enemy; much like the one prostitute who let the Israelite army in through the walls. That small seed, that single person, is enough to bring the city down.
Only those who are prepared spiritually for God, can be prepared for a miracle from God. Again, that doesn't necessarily mean that they have knowledge of Orthodoxy, it is about the heart and overall spiritual preparation.
Also, one should think of the symbolism here. All throughout the Bible there is imagery of Christ as the bridegroom and the church as the bride. To demand God to reveal himself is like demanding a stranger to have sex with you. If you demand miracles from God and for him to reveal himself to you, then you should re-read the story of Lot and the people who demanded the Angels visiting him (who were previously in the story used as a symbol of the Trinity) to have sex with them. And they were destroyed with fire. Symbolically because in some sense they were unprepared for the fire of God that they were demanding.
God is love itself. Saint Porphyrios and others speak about how this love is not merely some vague idea, but specifically goes into a divine Eros, an erotic sexual love for Christ and the Trinity. As scripture points to, to enter heaven is the same thing as entering the spiritual bridechamber of Christ. Of course I'm not talking about some literal physical sex, but it is a symbol of the higher divine reality. Heaven is an intense overwhelming intimacy. Anyone who is not prepared for this intimacy will reject it and possibly even go crazy in fear and confusion. God will not "rape" us by forcing heaven upon us. And although God is going to bring his presence into the whole universe in the end times, only those in heaven will feel any intimacy while those in hell will feel his love indirectly and as painful.
Another point is that God is the highest most unfathomable principle of existence beyond existence beyond existence... God himself has chastised man in scripture as to trying to peer into his ways and know who he is. Knowledge of such things is, and must be, a gift of God.
Orthodox believe in apophatic theology, by which we come to know God through negation by saying what he is not.
Conclusion: All arguments on Divine Hiddenness fail to address the beliefs of Eastern Orthodoxy, and typically only address Western conceptions of God by assuming Classical Theist ideas about God which Orthodoxy rejects, or otherwise fail through a demanding of divine intimacy or knowledge based on emotional appeals.
This comment is linked in his specific comment on Orthodox prophecies below:
Eastern Orthodox Prophecies are more convincing than any other Faiths
I should note here at the beginning that I am not saying that Orthodoxy is true because of its prophecies. I do not believe that miracles and prophecies by themselves can prove a faith is true.
If someone says something like "okay, these sound true, but why wouldn't God just tell everyone specific dates and just prove himself in an instant?", I will just say this misses the entire point of prophecies in our theology, and would direct you tomy post on Divine Hiddenness.
With that out of the way; What makes a convincing prophecy? A lot of it is determined by who it's for, and what it's purpose is, as even what skeptics would consider an incredibly vague prophecy can be used in a real holy way.
But interestingly, recently in a simple questions thread inspiring this post, there were some conjectures to u/AjaxBrozovicbringing up this issue. The main points given were that:
· Vague Prophecy can retroactively claim to be true, or someone can act on their own to "make" the prophecy come true
· Predictions of Natural occurances (like lunar eclipse) is not prophecy, it should be uncommon
· We need a Prophecy to be seen as being clearly fulfilled in the moment, and even expected beforehand and intended as a prophecy, so as not to be self-fufilling
· Skeptics want prophecy to be consistent
· it cannot simply be based on conjecture and hearsay
u/c0d3rman even gave a post on criteria for miracles, that they have to be:
· Not based upon simple deduction
· Risky, i.e. seemed unlikely to be true at the time
· Falsifiable, such that it can be disproved rather than fit to any time period
· Exceptional, rather than one success among failures
· Tamper-proof, something unable to be be fit to the prophecy by wanna-be fulfillers of prophecy
· Precise, such that it is clear what it is predicting before as well as after
These seem similar to what those in the SQ thread mentioned, and i think there could be said to be a general consensus based upon certain principles of knowledge that skeptics have.
I believe that Orthodox prophecies can, more or less, fit all of these criteria. Of course some more than others, but I will focus on the best examples.
Now, to preface, there are not very many Orthodox prophecies that mention specific dates, but I simply believe that is due to our theology, where the timeline of history is in some sense not set in stone. Although there is a certain fate that will happen, repentance can push it back, and sins 'speed up' the endtimes. So the prophecies will give general timeframes and orders of events instead. Accuracy here instead comes from the order of events being very specific Geopolitical events that follow one after another, with each successive true prophecy becoming more and more improbable, as you shall see, so that by the end it is impossible for that chain of events to line up as prophecized, like how tossing a coin a trillion times and getting heads every time, the odds go up until improbability.
First major prophecy I will give is one from a Monk from 1053 AD who wished to stay anonymous (or some say it might be from Saint Kosmos 1753 AD as a copyist error). Even if a skeptic doesn't want to believe it is dated that early, the first modern publishing of it was from 1913, which still leaves room for being fulfilled prophecies. Here is more information on it. Either way, It was providential that it was rediscovered in 1913, since every prophecy occurs directly after its modern rediscovery. The prophecy states that in order, these events will happen:
1. Great European War
2. Defeat of Germany, Catastrophe of Russia and Austria
3. Defeat of the Turks by the Greeks
4. Reinforcement of the Turks by the Greeks and defeat of the Greeks
5. Slaughter of the Orthodox peoples
6. Great turbulence/anxiety among the Orthodox nations
7. Invasion of foreign troops from the Adriatic sea [i.e. Italy, across this sea from Greece]. Woe unto those who live on the earth; for hades is ready
8. The Hagarene is great for a moment ["Hagarene" is an old term for Arab Muslims, since they are believed to descend from Ishmael]
9. A New European War
10. Union of Orthodox nations with Germany
11. Defeat of the French by the Germans
12. Revolution in India and its separation from England
In the 20th century, these events happened in order:
1. "The Great War", also called WW1, 1914
2. Germany is defeated in the War. The Austro-Hungarian Empire ends, and Russia falls to communism, 1918
3. Greece defeats Turks, there is the Treaty of Sèvres, and Greece occupies parts of Turkey in Smyrna, 1920
4. In Turkey Kemal Atarurk gains power and starts a revolt, 1923
5. Millions of Orthodox are killed in Turkey, as well as millions killed under communism in Russia, and in Nazi germany. The Greek Genocide, the Serb Genocide, the Russian Holodomor and Great Purge, the Armenian Genocide.
6. Great turbulence among Orthodox nations
7. Italy invades Greece, capturing Greek Islands in 1912 and going to war officially later around 1939
8. This could signify the sudden rise of Arab nations with oil fields, first discovered in Saudi Arabia in 1938
9. The New European War of WWII, 1939
10. Bulgarians and Romanians, some of the only countries at the time that could reasonably be called Orthodox nations, both allied with Germany, c. 1940-1944
11. Defeat of the French by the Germans. Northern half of country is occupied, c. 1940-1944
12. Revolution in India and its Separation from England, 1947
These first twelve prophecies have been fulfilled perfectly in line with what we would expect. There are actually more, but you can see them in the link so I won't go into detail. But the next two are:
· 13) England will be left to the Saxons alone
· 14) Victory of the Orthodox nations and general Slaughter of the Sons of Hagar [Again, meaning Turkish and Arab Muslims] by the Orthodox
This is highly relevant with the collapse of all of Britain's colonies, Brexit, and pushes for greater Scottish independence. And the 14th prophecy here would be interpreted in line with other Orthodox prophecies over the centuries that speak of the same thing as being Russia invading Turkey to start WW3, which seems potentially ever closer to us today.
Saint Paisios prophecized in detail that when Greece will extend its nautical limit in the Aegean dispute, Turkey will go to war with Greece, Turkey will close off the straights which causes Russia to invade Turkey for access to the Mediterranean, and then the EU steps in and WW3. Thus the prophecy of victory over the hagarenes is interpreted as a future Russia conquering Turkey.
Someone might say that these aren't in order. Generally they are, but it depends on how you interpret the "official" beginning and endings of different events. For a man presumably seeing such things through spiritual visions and writing down what he sees, i dont see why it needs to be perfect to what our governments would consider the beginning and end.
Is this prophecy vague? Some of them, but in general it is very specific. It certainly isn't common events, and was incredibly unlikely to expect these things either in 1053 or 1913, is not based on hearsay but a historical document. It is exceptional as each comes true except more future events. It is precise enough that someone in 1914 seeing that it said the war would end with Germanys defeat could bet on it, and on the overturning of Greek victory, a future Orthodox Genocide, an Italian invasion of Greece, etc., and be completely right, even if he didn't have the details. I don't see how someone can deny this fitting the earlier criteria without sophistry or moving the goalposts to demand prophecies can only be valid if they have specific dates. And certainly if the future events of WW3 come true, it should make you believe.
Another example:
Elder Aristocleus told people rejoicing about the end of WWI that "But there will be another war. Only do not rejoice then. Many Russians will think that the Germans will deliver Russia from Bolshevik government, but this is not so. True, the Germans will enter Russia and will do much there, but they will leave, for the time of salvation [i.e. end of communism] will not yet have come. That will be later, later.” (The Life of Elder Aristocleus, Moscow 2003, Dependency of the Russian Monastery of St Panteleimon on Mt Athos, pg. 18-25).
Aristocleus also prophecized before the soviet revolution: "An evil will shortly take Russia, and wherever this evil goes, rivers of blood will flow. It is not the Russian soul, but an imposition on the Russian soul. It is not an ideology, nor a philosophy, but a spirit from hell. In the last days Germany will be divided. France will be just nothing. Italy will be judged by natural disasters. Britain will lose her empire and all her colonies and will come to almost total ruin, but will be saved by praying enthroned women. America will feed the world, but will finally collapse. Russia and China will destroy each other."
So he got right that:
1. Russia falls to communism
2. Germany is split in two
3. France is conquered
4. Britain loses all her colonies
5. America becomes a breadbasket and world power that is now in decline
6. That they would all happen in this general order
There are a few other good examples of prophecies I can give, although I am running out of character space, so ask. But even one example of a True Prophecy should in principle be enough to prove supernatural origin, if one accepts that it has passed the criteria required, which this absolutely has.
u/ShakaUVM said in the SQ that skeptics faced with a true prophecy would "just claim it was a hoax or "obvious all along" or something like that. Confirmation Bias is a helluvah drug."
Prove him wrong?
Also, linked to this second prophecy: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiun-a2vcOEAxWlVqQEHd_rBwcQrAIoAXoECCIQAg&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.reddit.com%2Fr%2FPropheciesOfTheFuture%2Fcomments%2Fygrhir%2Fprophecies_of_saint_aristocles_of_moscow_elder%2F&usg=AOvVaw1gTXEge4wl9hkI5c5SI376&opi=89978449
Prophecies of Saint Aristocles of Moscow, Elder Theodosius (Kashin) of Minvody, Seraphim (Vyritsky) of Moscow, Eldress Duniushka of Siberia, St. Paisios the Athonite, St. Nilus the Myrrhgusher and St. Seraphim of Sarov and Archbishop Anthony of Voronezh
Saint Aristocles of Moscow (†1918):
"An evil will shortly take Russia, and wherever this evil goes, rivers of blood will flow. It is not the Russian soul, but an imposition on the Russian soul. It is not an ideology, nor a philosophy, but a spirit from hell. In the last days Germany will be divided. France will be just nothing. Italy will be judged by natural disasters. Britain will lose her empire and all her colonies and will come to almost total ruin, but will be saved by praying enthroned women. America will feed the world, but will finally collapse.
Russia and China will destroy each other. Finally, Russia will be free and from her believers will go forth and turn many from the nations to God."
"Now we are undergoing the times before the Antichrist. But Russia will yet be delivered. There will be much suffering, much torture. The whole of Russia will become a prison, and one must greatly entreat the Lord for forgiveness. One must repent of one's sins and fear to do even the least sin, but strive to do good, even the smallest. For even the wing of a fly has weight, and God's scales are exact. And when even the smallest of good in the cup tips the balance, then will God reveal His mercy upon Russia."
"The end will come through China. There will be an extraordinary outburst and a miracle of God will be manifested. And there will be an entirely different life, but all this will not be for long."
"God will remove all leaders, so that Russian people should look only at Him. Everyone will reject Russia, other states will renounce her, delivering her to herself.“ This is so that Russian people should hope on the help of the Lord. You will hear that in other countries disorders have begun similar to those in Russia. You will hear of war, and there will be wars.
But wait until the Germans take up arms, for they are chosen as God's weapon to punish Russia - but also as a weapon of deliverance later. The Cross of Christ will shine over the whole world and our Homeland will be magnified and will become as a lighthouse in the darkness for all."
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"The deliverance of Russia from the Red yoke Father [now Saint - editor] John prophesied as being from the East."
[Source: I. K. Sursky, Father John of Kronstadt (Belgrade, 1942), vol. 2, pp. 3, 23-24]
This prophecy of St. John of Kronstadt is also mentioned by Fr. Seraphim Rose in his lecture "The Future of Russia and the End of the World".
"...they that dwell on the earth shall wonder, whose names were not written in the book of life from the foundation of the world, when they behold the beast that was, and is not, and yet is." (Rev. 17:8)
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The Catacomb Elder Theodosius (Kashin) of Minvody (†1948), shortly after the outbreak of war with Germany in 1941, declared:
"Do you really think that that was the war (1941-45)?! The war is still to come. It will begin from the east. And then from all sides, like locusts, the enemies will spread over Russia... That will be the war!"
Furthermore Schema-Archimandrite Seraphim (Tyapochkin) relates concerning the prophecies of Elder Theodosius:
"The greatest tragedy will be the seizure of Siberia by China. This will not take place through military means: in consequence of the weakening of the authorities and the open frontiers, masses of Chinese will move into Siberia, will snap up property, enterprises and flats. By means of bribery, intimidation and agreements with the authorities, they will gradually take control of the economic life of the towns.
Everything will take place in such a way that one morning the Russians living in Siberia will wake up in a Chinese state. The destiny of those who remain there will be tragic, but not hopeless. The Chinese will deal cruelly with every attempt at resistance. (That was why the elder prophesied a martyric end in the stadium of the Siberian town for many Orthodox and patriots of the Homeland.)
The West will assist this creeping conquest of our land and in every way support the military and economic might of China out of hatred for Russia. But then they will see the danger for themselves, and when the Chinese try to conquer the Urals, this time by military might, and go even further, they will by all means hinder this and will even be able to help Russia in deflecting the invasion from the East.
Russia must stand her ground in this battle; after sufferings and complete impoverishment she will find in herself the strength to recover. And the coming regeneration will begin in the lands conquered by the enemies, in the midst of Russians left in the former republics of the Union. There Russian people will realize what they have lost, will recognize themselves to be citizens of that Fatherland which is still alive..."
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Saint Seraphim (Vyritsky) of Moscow:
“When the East will get stronger, everything will become shaky. Numbers are on their side. But not only that: they have sober workers and industrious people, while there is such drunkenness with us. There will come a time when Russia will be torn into pieces. At first they will divide it, and then they will begin to steal its wealth.
The West will do everything to help the destruction of Russia and for a time will give its eastern part to China. The Far East will fall into the hands of Japan, and Siberia to the Chinese, who will begin to move into Russia, marry Russian women and in the end, by cunning and craftiness, will seize the territory of Siberia as far as the Urals. But when China will want to go further, the West will resist and will not allow it."
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Martyr-Eldress Duniushka of Siberia (†1918):
"At the far end of Russia, there will be an enormous earthquake. The waters will break out of the ocean, flooding the continent, and many nations will perish. Many diseases beyond understanding will appear. The face of the earth will change. The people will comprehend their guilt; they will come to understand how far they have departed from God and from His teachings, and then they will begin to be reborn...
In the course of one of those centuries, Asia will bestir herself; she will try to penetrate into Europe, but her attempts will be futile. No one will ever overcome 'Holy Rus', and only through her will salvation come to the world."
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St. Paisios the Athonite:
"The Mid-East will become a theater of a war in which the Russians will take part. Much blood will be spilled. The Chinese, with an army of 200 million, will cross the Euphrates and go all the way to Jerusalem."
St. Nilus the Myrrhgusher:
"All the nations of Europe will be armed against Russia. The Tsar [i.e. the Russian leader, whatever his contemporary title] will summon all his European and Asiatic peoples. The belligerents will meet in an immensely wide plain where a terrific battle will be fought and will last for eight days. The result will be a victory of the West over the Russians."
The Anonymous Prophet from Mount Athos (1053):
"Union of the six states against the seventh, Russia, and slaughter for three days. Cessation of the war by an Angel of Christ God, and handing over of the city [Constantinople] to the Greeks."
And finally both St. Seraphim of Sarov and Archbishop Anthony of Voronezh (†1846) state in almost the same words:
"Constantinople and Jerusalem will be taken by the combined forces of Russia and others. During the partition of Turkey, almost all of it will be apportioned to Russia."
Equally predictably, however, no matter how many times this fact is communicated to the non-[True] Orthodox, and no matter on how many forums, it continues to be completely ignored by them and the societies which are predominantly non-Orthodox, and even by many commentators who claim to be from a country or have obvious origins in a country, which is largely, nominally “Orthodox”.
This is noteworthy especially as, for example “The Orthodox Case for Brexit” by Vladimir (in baptism) (legally, Dr. Anthony Moss), written after the 2016 Referendum, but before the UK and Gibraltar left the EU (very illegally in my view), and a personal opinion, keeps on popping up on Academia.edu, from where I downloaded the paper below.
Having received the scholarly paper appended below by free download from Academia.edu. I really do hope that I finally get some sort of acknowledgement and actual serious reply (there have only been a handful of likes) from non-Orthodox sources as I have constantly posted comments on social media to mainstream publications but have failed to get any meaningful reply from them, despite what must be, by now, thousands of postings.
Let us hope, to repeat my earlier request, that some scholarly attention, including from the non-Orthodox, is now finally addressed to the [True] Orthodox Christian Prophecies.
The links which follow below are in the order they came up in a search “The Anonymous Prophecy of Mount Athos of 1053” (accessed in Lôgo de Deus, Eiras, Coimbra, Beira Litoral, Região de Centro, Portugal) on Google Chrome just after 8am on Saturday 11/24/2/2024/7532 in the abbreviated full [Traditional] Orthodox Christian dating system used by TRUE Orthodox Christians.
https://byzantineprophecy.com/2020/05/10/the-anonymous-prophecy-of-1053-ad/
The Scribd article now follows, illuminating the preservation and divulgation of the Prophecy in the 20thcentury:
Anonymous Prophecy of 1053 AD
This prophecy is contained in most Orthodox eschatological books based on the Constantinople prophecies. Not much is known about it or its origins. Archimandrite Neilos Sotiropoulos writes in his book, The Coming Two Edge Sword: “The prophecy texts preserved are found in Northern Epirus, Epirus, and western Macedonia. They were found and are located in the Holy Monastery of Naum, Ochrid. It was found in Northern Epirus by the priest-monk, Archimandrite Neophytos Kalofountis, who served there as a soldier in 1914 after the liberation of Ioannina.
“The ever-memorable lay-preacher, Demetrios Panagopoulos recorded another copy in his book, Saints and Sages Concerning What Will Happen in the Future. The text is continuous and not divided into verses or enumerated. He mentions that “it is found at the Holy Monastery Kozani.” This copy of the prophecy is obviously by an uneducated writer [i.e. not Panagopoulos, but the prophecy text he used]; it inadvertently has spelling errors and variations in a few words, though without changing the meaning. It was found written on a papyrus. At the end of the text, it bears the timeline of being written in 1503 AD, while in the caption it states 1053 AD.
“The Old Calendarist Bishop of Kalamata, Gregorios, records another copy of the prophecy text in his book, “What We and Our Children Will See.” It reports that it is found in the Holy Serbian Monastery, Kozani. The text has minimal differences from the previous in words and spelling errors without changing the meaning.
“Another text is found in a village of the prefecture of Kozani and is also written on papyrus. In 1937, a Gendarme appeared at a village house to collect tax. An old woman, the only inhabitant of the house, told him she had paid the tax. The Gendarme asked for the receipt. The old lady, not knowing letters advised him to search the chest to find it. He emptied all the documents onto the floor. He found the receipt and congratulated the old woman. He also noticed an ancient document of prophecy amongst the papers. He took it, copied it and circulated it in many copies. In 1962, a Macedonian journalist published the text of this prophecy in a pamphlet with still more annotations. A Thessalonian gave me this booklet in 1972.
“Also, the Hagiorite Monk, Nektarios Katsaros’ small booklet, “Prophecies Concerning Constantinople’s Liberation” also contains this prophecy. I bought this book in 1957 at Karyes, Mount Athos where I went and was tonsured a monk.”
Some books state that there is a copy of this prophecy at the Holy Monastery of Koutloumousiou, Mount Athos.
The Text of the Prophecy:
1. Great European war.
2. Defeat of Germany, destruction of Russia and Austria.
3. Defeat of Turks by the Greeks.
4. Strengthening of the Hagarenes by Western nations and defeat of the Greeks by the Hagar.
5. Slaughter of Orthodox peoples.
6. Great distress of Orthodox peoples.
7. Entrance of foreign armies from the Adriatic Sea. Woe to the inhabitants upon the earth; Hades is ready.
8. For a moment the Hagarene is great.
9. New European war.
10. Union of Orthodox peoples with Germany.
11. Defeat of France by the Germans.
12. Revolt of India and its separation by England.
13. England will be restricted to only Saxony.
14. Victory of the Orthodox peoples and general slaughter of the Hagarenes by the Orthodox.
15. Uneasiness of the world.
16. General despair upon the earth.
17. Battle of seven nations in Constantinople. Slaughter for three days and three nights. Victory of the greater nation against the six nations.
18. Alliance of the six nations against the seventh nation, slaughter for three days and three nights.
19. Cessation of war by an angel (of God-Christ) and handing over the City to the Greeks.
20. Submission of Latins to the infallible Orthodox Faith.
21. The Orthodox faith will be spread from the East to the West.
22. Fear and trembling of the barbarians by this.
23. Cessation of the Pope and the proclamation of one Patriarch for all of Europe.
24. In fifty-five years the end of the tribulations. On the seventh there is no one afflicted, no one exiled, returning to the arms of the rejoicing Mother (Church).
Amen. Amen. Amen.
I am the Alpha and the Omega.
The First and the Last.
Finally one shepherd and in the flock the true Orthodox Faith.
Amen. Amen. Amen.
(Slave of Christ, the True God).
http://thetruechrist.blogspot.com/2013/02/the-anonymous-prophecy-1053-ad.html
https://www.orthodoxchristianbooks.com/articles/451/is-there-a-secret-ruler-world/
https://twitter.com/AdrianWhyatt/status/1097813593112887296
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H90YtrZdy0w&list=PL4K8X26IP6lhVOW5xkX9BX58inZfuUA6U&pp=iAQB
https://youtu.be/2v3eDNgcNMs?si=YOvfg9E3q4fznVrN
(in Greek)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XKFID6X1DZI
https://www.academia.edu/25319072/THE_RESTORATION_OF_ROMANITY
Mount Athos should pray for the triumph of the Turkish armies during the war. ... An Anonymous Prophet of Mount Athos (1053). After describing the main events of ...
On page 230 of 516 (at the end of the entire publication we find that the work as a whole was compiled as follows, first published on September 18/ October 1, 2014; revised October 30 / November 12, 2014 and May 1/14, 2016.
St. Tamara, Queen of Georgia):
: 3. An Anonymous Prophet of Mount Athos (1053). After describing the main events of the early 20thcentury with amazing accuracy, the prophet continues: “New European War [1939-1945]. Union of Orthodox Peoples with Germany [1940]. Submission of the French to the Germans [1940]. Rebellion of the Indians and their separation from the English [1947]. England for the Saxons only…Victory of the Orthodox, defeat of the Muslims. General slaughter of the Muslims and of the barbarians by the Orthodox peoples. Anxiety of the world. General hopelessness on the earth. Battle of seven states for Constantinople and slaughter for three days. Victory of the largest state over the six. Union of the six states against the seventh, Russia, and slaughter for three days. Cessation of the war by an Angel of Christ God, and handing over of the city to the Greeks. Submission of the Latins to the unerring faith of the Orthodox. Exaltation of the Orthodox faith from the East to the West. Cessation of the Roman papacy. Declaration of one patriarch for the whole of Europe for five or fifty years. In the seventh is no wretched man; no one is banished. Returning to the arms of Mother Church rejoicing. Thus shall it be. Thus shall it be. Amen."
http://prawoslawnikatolicy.pl/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/5_THE_BOOK_OF_THE_END.pdf
This was published in 2007. We find for the Anonymous Prophecy the following on page 139 of 334: It seems reasonable to identify this eight-day battle with the two three-day battles mentioned by the anonymous Athonite prophet of 1053, which also ends in the defeat of Russia, the intervention of an angel and the resurrection of Orthodoxy: "Battle of seven states for Constantinople and slaughter for three days. Victory of the largest state over the six. Union of the six states against the seventh, Russia, and slaughter for three days. Cessation of the war by an Angel of Christ God, and handing over of the city to the Greeks. Submission of the Latins to the unerring faith of the Orthodox. Exaltation of the Orthodox faith from the East to the West. Cessation of the Roman papacy. Declaration of one patriarch for the whole of Europe for five or fifty years. In the seventh is no wretched man; no one is banished. Returning to the arms of Mother Church rejoicing. Thus shall it be. Thus shall it be. Amen."
A basic example of it in video form: https://youtu.be/XKFID6X1DZI?si=faRAW-e50cWv-7-E
Finally I would add that we must understand everything in the light of Holy Tradition, which includes both written and unwritten tradition, linked often by the holy icons which are written, not painted or drawn.
In that respect, the fact that today is the feast of the restorer of the Holy icons for the final time, the Empress Theodora, is especially apposite:
The Righteous Empress Theodora Commemorated on February 11 The Righteous Empress Theodora was the wife of the Greek emperor Theophilos the Iconoclast (829-842), but she did not share in the heresy of her husband and secretly she venerated holy icons. After the death of her husband, when Saint Theodora governed the realm together with her in age minor son Michael, she restored the veneration of icons, bringing back the deposed holy Patriarch Meletios and convened a Council, at which the Iconoclasts were anathematised. And by her was started the celebration of this event – the Triumph of Orthodoxy, which annually is celebrated on the 1st Sunday of Great Lent. Righteous Theodora did much for Holy Church and moreover nourished in her son Michael a firm devotion to Orthodoxy. © 1996-2001 by translator Fr. S. Janos. | |
Yours sincerely and with love in Christ
Adrian Whyatt, RejoinEU Party Iberia Co-ordinator, In a Personal Capacity, and a True Orthodox Christian Layman, also in a personal capacity, Saturday 11/24/2/2024/7532, 38th Week after Pentecost. Amongst the feasts celebrated today are the following:
Hieromartyr Blaise, bishop of Sebaste (316).
St. Vsevolod (in holy baptism Gabriel), prince and wonderworker of Pskov (1138).
Venerable Demetrius, monk of Priluki (Vologda) (1392).
Venerable Cassian the Barefoot (in the world 'Kosmas'), ascetic of the Joseph-Volokolamsk Monastery (1532)
St. Theodora, wife of Emperor Theophilus the Iconoclast (867).
St. Gobnait, abbess of Ballyvourney, Cork (Ireland) (7th c.) (Celtic & British).
Venerable Caedmon of Whitby, monk (680) (Celtic & British).
Venerable George (Kratovac) the Greatmartyr of Serbia (Greek).
Hieromartyr Lucius of Adrianopolis in Thrace (348).
St. Benedict of Aniane (821) (Gaul)
Revised the following day with the insertion of the Scribd Article, which is the
Sunday of the Publican and the Pharisee. The Main saints and feasts commemorated today, February 12 (Old Style)(O.S.) (used by the Church for Liturgical Purposes - various miracles occur in accordance with this, such as the Miracle of the Holy Light (aka Fire) 🔥 in on Holy Saturday /25 (New Style (N.S.) - the global civil (aka Gregorian, which now has the interposition of such things as atomic seconds to take into account changes in the earth´s orbit) calendar used for planting and harvesting of crops and other activities dependent on solar time) / 2024 (Anno Domini) (AD (Year of our Lord)/ 7532 (Year From Adam and the Creation of the World) (YFA) (The Church New Year is calculated according to this calendar, occurring on September 1st (OS)/14 (NS). The difference between the Church and the civil calendar is due to increase to 14 days in March 2100.
Iveron Icon (Moscow) of the Most Holy Theotokos (9th c.).
St. Meletius, archbishop of Antioch (381).
St. Alexis, metropolitan of Moscow and wonderworker of all Russia (1378).
St. Meletius, archbishop of Kharkov (1840).
New Hieromartyr Alexius (Buy), bishop of Voronezh (1930).
New Martyr Mitrophan, archpriest (1931).
Venerable Mary, nun (who was called Marinus), and her father, St. Eugene, monk, at Alexandria (6th c.).
St. Anthony II, patriarch of Constantinople (895).
Saint Meletios of Lardos, Founder of Ypseni Monastery (19th c.).
Venerable Bassian, disciple of St. Paisius of Uglich and abbot of Ryabovsky Forest Monastery, Uglich (1509).
Callia, righteous.
Venerable Gertrude of Nijvel, abbess (659) (Neth.).
St. Ethilwald of Lindisfarne (740) (Celtic & British).
New Martyr Chrestos at Constantinople (1748) (Greek).
Martyrs Saturnius and Plotonus (Greek).
Hieromartyr Urban us, bishop of Rome (223-230).
Holy Fathers Prokhore the Georgian (11th c.), Luka (Mukhaidze) of Jerusalem (1277), Nikoloz Dvali (1314), аnd the Holy Fathers of the Georgian Monasteries in Jerusalem (Georgia).
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The Brexit Religion and the Holy Grail of the NHS
Steven Kettell
Department of Politics and International Studies
University of Warwick
s.kettell@warwick.ac.uk
Peter Kerr
Department of Political Science and International Studies University of Birmingham p.kerr@bham.ac.uk
Abstract
The role of populism in mobilising support for Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union has been well noted. But a key feature of populist politics – the use of religious discourses – has been largely overlooked. This article addresses this gap by exploring the way in which the Leave campaign framed Brexit in quasi-religious and mythological terms. Three core themes are identified: (1) That the British ‘people’ had a unique role to play in global affairs. (2) That the sanctity of this special status was threatened by elites and migrants. (3) That the referendum gave voice to the sacred ‘will of the people’. These narratives were underpinned by a strategic discourse centring on claims that EU membership was exacerbating a crisis in health and social care. This myth was encapsulated by the so-called ‘Brexit bus’ campaign.
Keywords: Populism, religion, political myth, social policy, Brexit, NHS
Analysing Brexit
The UK’s 2016 referendum decision to leave the European Union (or ‘Brexit’ as it has come to be known) was arguably the country’s most disruptive political event since the Second World War. Unsurprisingly, this decision continues to be the subject of sizeable commentary and debate. Within these analyses it is widely recognised that populism played a pivotal role in mobilising support for the Leave campaign. Brexit is often seen as the result of ‘a populist mindset’ (Freeden, 2017) linked to ‘a new nationalist populism in western Europe’ (Gusterton,
2017). At the heart of such analyses is a recognition that Brexit exemplifies an era of post-truth politics (Hopkin and Rosamond, 2017) encapsulated by the promulgation of myths, fantasies and misinformation, stoking fears and false expectations amongst voters (Browning 2019; Kettell and Kerr, 2019). Many such narratives have been employed to fuel anti-immigration and anti-establishment fervour (e.g. Hobolt, 2016; Dennison and Geddes, 2018; Virdee and
McGeever, 2018).
Within this scholarship, debate exists around the balance between the ‘cultural’ and the
‘economic’ drivers of the current populist wave. For some, Brexit should be interpreted as a ‘cultural backlash’ against socially liberal values (Inglehart and Norris, 2016), or as an appeal to imperialist nostalgia (Clarke and Newman, 2017). Others view it as a reaction to the economic consequences of globalisation, neo-liberalism and austerity (Hopkin, 2017; Powell,
2017; Watson, 2018), whilst some have seen it as part of a wider backlash against ‘modernisation’ (Kerr et al, 2018). As such, Brexit provides an ideal case study for understanding the inner dynamics of populist discourse and tactics (Corbett, 2016; Ruzza and Pejovic, 2019).
One aspect that has been underexplored in these studies is the link between Brexit, populism and religion. What little research exists in this area has tended to approach the topic through the lens of religious views and voting behaviour in the referendum (e.g. Knowles, 2018; Smith and Woodhead, 2018), leaving wider questions about the constitution of religious and populist themes unaddressed. This is an unusual omission given the degree to which populist politicians around the world have openly drawn on religious tropes and motifs. Examples include the links between Donald Trump and the Christian Right in the United States (Whitehead et al, 2018), the use of Christianity as an anti-Islamic identity marker by populists in Europe (Van Kessel
2016) and the rise of Hindu nationalism in India (Wojczewski, 2019). As Arato and Cohen
(2017) note, populist rhetoric has ‘an elective affinity with certain religious ideas or tropes’
(such as apocalyptic threats, the idea of a unique people and the need for salvation) and ‘religion is now playing an important role in the new populisms’. Or, as Mao (2017) puts it: ‘One of the perplexing features of populist movements and ideologies is that, although they often unfold in a secular milieu, they have scarcely disguised religious connotations’.
In some ways this omission from the field of UK politics is an understandable one. The UK is a largely secularised society and religion exerts little overt control over public life. Nevertheless, our aim is here to show that crucial parts of the discourse surrounding Brexit were grounded in a number of quasi-religious tropes and mythical themes. The article explores these issues using a qualitative content analysis of the discourse used by prominent Brexit supporters during and after the referendum campaign. To examine this, the study compiled a dataset designed to capture the main sources of political debate and communication from Leave advocates. This dataset was centred principally on the UK’s official record of Parliamentary proceedings (Hansard), and involved more than one hundred debates, statements and questions relating to Brexit since the 2016 referendum. This corpus was supplemented by transcripts of speeches collected from the UKPOL political speech archive (www.ukpol.co.uk) and the official Vote Leave website (http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org), as well as reports collected by a comprehensive search of the media database, LexisNexus.
To identify common discursive frames, these data were subject to a qualitative content analysis. This is defined by Hsieh and Shannon (2005: 1278) as ‘a research method for the subjective interpretation of the content of text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes and patterns’. Data were analysed manually, and the discursive themes were revealed as an emergent property of the text, as opposed to being theoretically derived.
In what follows we explore three core discursive strategies employed by Leave campaigners. First is the idea that the British ‘people’ have a unique political, cultural and historical role to play in global affairs. The second is that the sanctity of Britain’s special status is under threat from European elites and an influx of foreign migrants. The third is that the EU referendum gave voice to the sacred ‘will of the people’, putting the implementation of Brexit beyond question. In these respects, Brexit was presented by the Leave campaign as a necessary path towards liberation from the clutches of Brussels, enabling the British people to fulfil their historic destiny as a global free-trading nation. At the same time, whilst such narratives remained largely metaphysical in their appeal, the benefits of Brexit were given more concrete expression through the strategic use of discourses around UK social policy. This was especially the case for the ‘Holy Grail’ of British politics, the National Health Service (NHS). This was directly linked to the case for Brexit through a high-profile ‘Brexit bus’ campaign, signalling that an extra £350 million would be provided for the NHS each week if the UK voted to leave. This myth reinforced claims that public services were under siege from a combination of uncontrolled immigration and the financial cost of EU membership. As such, leaving the EU was presented as the necessary panacea for the failings of the UK’s social care system.
This analysis makes a direct contribution to studies of Brexit, as well as to the growing body of work on the relationship between religion and populism, by showing how quasi-religious and mythical themes can be used to underpin a populist discourse. The rest of the article proceeds as follows. We begin by outlining the relationship between the spheres of politics and religion, highlighting some of the ways in which populism can draw on religious themes. We then move to examine the quasi-religious tropes and discursive myths that were recruited by the Leave campaign to mobilise support for Brexit. Finally, we show how these various elements were marshalled to stoke voters’ fears and expectations around a perceived crisis in health and social care provision through the NHS ‘Brexit bus’ campaign.
Populism and (secular) religion
The realms of the ‘political’ and the ‘religious’ have been deeply connected since the earliest forms of human society. For millennia, religious and mythical elements (such as the idea that rulers represented divine will or were divine themselves) provided the organising basis and legitimacy for the social order (Bellah, 1964). Importantly, as Habermas (2011: 17) notes, this legitimising power was understood as something that stood external to society itself. Thus: ‘“Religion” owes its legitimizing force to the fact that it has its own roots, independently of politics’. During the last millennium, however, this relationship has experienced a fundamental transformation. The onset of functional differentiation, the autonomisation of social spheres and the secularisation of state authority from the eighteenth century led to the increasing privatisation and decline of religion and to the loss of an external anchor for political legitimacy. This disappearance of society’s ‘metasocial character’ (ibid. 21) led to the development of new bases for social order and legitimacy in which the socially integrative role of religion was supplanted by secular concepts such as ‘the nation’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘the people’. Importantly, however, these concepts represented secular forms of ideas that were initially framed in theological terms, famously described by Schmitt (2005) as ‘political theological concepts’. As Chibundu (2006) explains, the notion of sovereignty is a concept ‘as mystical and based on religious faith as are the notions of trinity and arianism’.
Thus, even under conditions of secularisation the organising principles and legitimising bases of political institutions ‘are founded in never fully accessible metanormative structures — deep-seated, unconscious assumptions that without being normative themselves determine the meaning of truth, justice, law within a socio-political order as a whole’ (Arato, 2013). The boundaries between the secular and the religious spheres are often blurred, such that certain aspects of religion can be co-opted by the secular. Mavelli (2019) illustrates this with the rise of neoliberalism, a system requiring ‘faith’ in the efficacy of the free market that has become ‘a quasi-religious authority’ in most Western societies. In short, even in secularised contexts, religious themes continue to provide a useful governing resource for maintaining social order. As Maier (2007) points out, ‘religion does not allow itself to be easily banished from society, and that, where this is tried, it returns in unpredictable and perverted forms’.
Religious themes can become intwined with the secular in a variety of ways. These include ‘political religions’, a concept devised to explain totalitarian systems such as those in Fascist and Communist regimes based on leadership cults, mass rallies, national liturgies, the construction of political fantasy worlds and the overt worship of the state (see Gentile, 2005; Maier, 2007), ‘civil religions’, a term used to describe a transcendent moral basis for the political institutions, beliefs, rituals and symbols of the nation (e.g. Williams, 2013), and ‘political myths’, described by Della Sala (2010) as discursive projects designed to set ‘the normative parameters of the nature of political authority and its use in a political community’.
In this sense, political myths explain a collective history and set out the values that define a group of people as being distinct from others.
Religious themes also permeate nationalist and populist varieties of politics, characterised by the use of ‘secularised theological concepts’ such as ‘the nation’, ‘the people’ and ‘sovereignty’
(Arato, 2013). Both forms emphasise the need for faith in an external power, appeal to emotion over rational forms of judgement and are marked by the affectivity of ceremonial rituals and symbols of national life, the use of mythologised national histories and claims to represent a territorially and/or culturally unique group of people, typically in need of salvation to fulfil a manifest destiny (e.g. Santiago, 2009; De Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017; Arato and Cohen 2017; Brubaker 2012; DeHanas and Shterin 2018; Mao, 2017).
The myths and religion of Brexit
A range of religious and mythological themes are visible in the case of Brexit. Critics of Brexit have frequently highlighted the way in which Leave campaigners indulged in a form of ‘unicorn politics’ (Sorkin, 2019) to persuade people that leaving the EU would fulfil a range of fantasies such as increased prosperity, political emancipation and lower levels of immigration (Browning, 2019). Some commentators have even drawn direct parallels to religion. Richard Dawkins has claimed that Brexit ‘has become a religion now. It has become a faith. It has become a creed’ (Humphreys, 2019). Jonathan Lis (2019) has described Brexit as a ‘medieval state religion’, casting its critics as ‘apostates or heretics’. The Conservative Attorney General, Geoffrey Cox, described Brexit as ‘an article of faith’ (BBC News, 2019).
One need not agree with the view that Brexit has become a religion to appreciate this critique. As Finlayson (2018) points out, the various components of ‘Brexitism’ are united by ‘an underlying “metaphysics” – an image of the world linked with a belief in redemption …
achieved by heroic resistance to a future imposed by alien and expert elites’.
These religious dimensions to Brexit were operationalised through three key discourses: the claim that the British people had an ‘exceptional’ status within Europe, a view of the EU as a nefarious threat to this status, and an insistence that the sacred ‘will of the people’ expressed in the referendum had to be obeyed. These discourses combined to frame Brexit as the road to a form of national salvation and historic destiny for the UK, while effectively placing it beyond the reach of intellectual, rational contestation.
‘The special status of the British people’
These mythological narratives began with a repeated appeal to the legitimising role of ‘the people’ in driving the Brexit process. As Mao (2017) points out, in populist discourse ‘the people’ are often presented as a ‘quasi-religious notion’ that opens the route ‘to a decline in concern for realism and an indulgence of irrational beliefs about social life’. For Brexiteers, one such belief, embedded within two centuries of British foreign policy, was that ‘Britain is a European actor of an exceptional kind’ (Daddow, 2015), and, as such, Brexit was about
‘restoring and enhancing the distinctive and exceptional aspects of the UK state’ (Gamble, 2018). This type of nativist appeal drilled into some of the core myths of British national identity (Smith 1999) framing the ‘British people’ as having a unique global reach in terms of their language, culture, historical connections and geography. Such populist framing is typically offered ‘as the birth of a straightforward cultural exclusivity that cannot be delegated, preceded or brushed aside, and that has propelled a given society on an irreversible path of preserving its unique properties in the face of continuous challenges’ (Freeden, 2017). For the
UK, its own irreversible path was to set itself free from the EU in order to reconnect with its historic destiny as a leading, autonomous, global free trading nation.
Such a view was expressed in statements from prominent Leave campaigners such as David Davis (2016), Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, who claimed that the history of Europe ‘is not our history … the European Project is not right for us. The Global Project is’.
The Conservative MP (and future Home Secretary) Priti Patel, likewise claimed that leaving the EU would enable the UK to ‘position ourselves as an outward-looking, global, free-trading country’ (Hansard, 29 January 2019), enabling its people to ‘choose our future and be in control of our destiny’ (Hansard, 29 March 2019). Boris Johnson (2018), the-then Foreign
Secretary (and later Prime Minister), claimed that Brexit would be ‘a manifestation of this country’s historic national genius’ and was ‘about re-engaging this country with its global identity … in keeping with Britain's deepest instincts and history’. The Conservative MP (and future Chairman of the influential, anti-EU, European Research Group), Mark Francois, claimed that being a global, free-trading nation was ‘historically in our national DNA’, and that Brexit would therefore enable the UK to ‘take back full control of our national destiny’
(Hansard, 29 March 2017).
Such rhetoric also brings to the fore a quasi-mystical view of History as a teleological force.
Thus, in reference to wider processes of globalisation, Boris Johnson (2016c) was able to claim that: ‘the European project is going against the tide of events and history’. By recognising this fact, the UK was uniquely placed to once again break the tyranny of regional protectionism and promote the spread of global free trade, a process which the Conservative MP (and future Foreign Secretary), Dominic Raab, claimed would directly benefit ‘the poorest African nations, currently languishing under the yolk of hypocritical western protectionism’ (Hansard, 31
January 2017). In this way, Brexit would not only provide salvation for the British people but would become a platform for Britain to offer deliverance to other parts of the globe.
It is fair to say that such narratives of British exceptionalism ‘were not the sole preserve of the
Leave campaign. They had been the stock-in-trade of pro-EU British politicians for decades’ (Daddow, 2018). The UK had long presented itself as an ‘outsider’ (Daddow, 2015), a reluctant or ‘awkward partner’ (George, 1994) and had used this awkwardness ‘to carve out a privileged position for itself’ (Menon and Salter, 2016) in the form of a number of opt-outs and exemptions from broader EU rules and mechanisms. At the heart of this idea of British exceptionalism was a construction of its identity as an island, set geopolitically apart from the rest of Europe, which had, through its unique buccaneering spirit, spawned its own vast Empire. Thus, ‘Europe’ in this tradition is a choice for Britain, not a necessity’ (Daddow, 2018). This idea of British exceptionalism has been particularly evident in the aftermath of the referendum, with a number of prominent Leave supporters echoing Boris Johnson’s sentiment that the UK should ‘have its cake and eat it’ in terms of enjoying a range of unique benefits to other non-
EU countries in its future relationship with the EU (Kettell and Kerr, 2019). As the journalist Jonathan Freedland put it, using a different culinary analogy, Britain has attempted to retain ‘all the ice-cream of EU membership and none of the spinach’ (Freedland, 2019).
‘The EU as threat’
Central to this construction of British exceptionalism was a view of the EU as an external, malign force posing an existential threat to the political and cultural traditions of the British people. Here the EU was portrayed as entrapping the UK within the bureaucratic and undemocratic structures of a federal superstate, locked into a failing economic model. According to Boris Johnson (2016a), the EU project was ‘getting out of control’, and that, in the ‘effort to build a country called Europe … The independence of this country is being seriously compromised’. The leader of the UK Independence Party, Nigel Farage (2016), claimed that the EU had ‘by stealth, by deception, without ever telling the truth to the British or the rest of the people of Europe … imposed upon them a political union’. The Conservative MP (and another future Chairman of the European Research Group), Jacob Rees-Mogg, described the EU as nothing less than ‘an imperial yoke’ (Hansard, 21 October 2019). Thus, Leave campaigners built the case for Brexit around the idea that the British people had been betrayed by a combination of metropolitan liberal and European elites, and, as such, Brexit provided a chance for ordinary hard-working British people to regain control over their national destiny (Clarke and Newman, 2017).
A core part of this narrative centred on the supposed threat to public services posed by ‘uncontrolled’ immigration from the EU. This threat was said to be getting worse with the impending accession to the EU of Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey (which wasn’t actually joining since accession negotiations had stalled). The Justice Secretary, Michael Gove, claimed that ‘public services such as the NHS will face an unquantifiable strain as millions more become EU citizens and have the right to move to the UK’ (May, 2016). Boris Johnson (2016b) warned that immigration was adding ‘a population the size of Newcastle every year, with all the extra and unfunded pressure that puts on the NHS and other public services’.
This type of moral panic aligned itself with a long history of racialized fears over immigration which the Leave campaign was able to exploit. As Virdee and McGeever (2018) point out, ‘a reservoir of latent racism could be activated through the production of appropriately coded language about immigration’, sending out a signal ‘that the Brexit project was precisely about keeping the nation Christian and white’. Thus, the nature of this threat hinged not just on the claim that immigrants were flooding in to drain the UK’s scarce resources, but that the entire
EU project was at odds with the fundamentally special character of the British people, their history and their unique global destiny. For the Leave campaign, such fears were used to stoke nostalgic ‘fantasies of fulfilment’ (Browning, 2019) as Brexit promised to restore the UK’s unique political and cultural ‘essence’, hitherto stolen or betrayed by EU elites and migrant populations.
The Irrefutable ‘Will of the People’
Such narratives of salvation ignited a level of political fervour with a quasi-religious quality. In the aftermath of the referendum the euphoria of victory quickly turned to a vehement preoccupation for many on the Leave side that Brexit was in the process of being stolen or betrayed by parliamentary and cultural elites. This betrayal narrative was used to fuel a heightened zeal for the idea that the sanctity of the narrow mandate that the referendum had provided for Brexit (with Leave winning by just 52-48%) must be protected at all costs. To this end, many on the Leave side quickly seized on PM David Cameron’s sentiment the morning after the referendum that ‘the British people have voted to leave the European Union and their will must be respected’. From this point, the discursive myth of the ‘will of the people’ formed an irrefutable and unassailable commandment, signalling to both the British establishment and those who voted Remain that nothing could stand in the way of the popular mandate.
Despite the slim margin of the referendum victory, the ‘will of the people’ came to represent ‘a singular homogeneous monolith’ (Freeden, 2017), transmuted into the unequivocal resolve of the British electorate as a whole. This served to sidestep the fact that the authority of the referendum mandate, and the type of instruction it conveyed to Parliament, had always been subject to intense contestation. Even before the referendum, many on the Remain side stressed that the European Union Referendum Act (2015) did not legally commit the government to implementing the result, while those on the Leave side argued that the government was committed politically (if not legally) to respecting the outcome. In the wake of the vote, such disputes became the subject of ever-more antagonistic debate. This was spurred by wider disagreements about the character of UK democracy and the extent to which the idea of popular sovereignty could be used to over-ride the historically grounded precedent of parliamentary sovereignty (Weale, 2017). Moreover, in the months after the referendum it became increasingly evident that the referendum vote had given no clear indication of what type of Brexit ‘the people’ had voted for.
Despite the plethora of divergent interpretations of the result, both prominent Leave figures and an increasingly strident tabloid press sought to elevate the myth of the ‘will of the people’ to the force of an ‘irreversible truth’ (Freeden, 2017), such that anyone seeking to contest its authority could be denounced as ‘traitors’ and charged with national betrayal. One of the most notable examples of this was an attack by the Daily Mail, which portrayed High Court judges as ‘enemies of the people’ for daring to insist that the process of formally leaving the EU required an explicit vote in Parliament. As such, ‘the ‘will of the people’ as expressed in the referendum was portrayed as ‘the only democratic institution’ (Elefteriadis, 2017), a supreme authority that could be unquestionably cited above all other political or legal institutions.
However, as negotiations between the UK and the EU revealed a variety of potential Brexit outcomes, it became politically expedient for different factions of the Leave camp to utilise the peoples’ will myth to mobilise support for a particular form of Brexit. Amidst the resulting factionalism that erupted within Parliament, the various sides began to engage in a ‘war of position’ to impose their own interpretations of what it was, precisely, that the people had voted for (Kettell and Kerr, 2019). At this point, a number of prominent Leave MPs began to perpetuate the myth that the vote had delivered a mandate for an ‘exclusively hard Brexit’, or a clean break with the EU (Elefteriadis, 2017). In the fevered Parliamentary debates that followed, the tenor of some MPs’ pitch for a hard Brexit was likened to that of a religious fervour. As the Conservative MP, Claire Perry, remarked: ‘I feel sometimes I am sitting alongside colleagues who are like jihadis in their support for a hard Brexit. No Brexit is hard enough. Be gone you evil Europeans. We never want you to darken our doors again' (Hansard 7 February 2017).
Such developments exposed a glaring contradiction at the heart of the Leave discourse. On the one hand, ‘the people’ was to be regarded as a monolithic and sacred force whose combined ‘will’ could be clearly interpreted and implemented in full. On the other hand, ‘the people’ were split into two antagonistic and irreconcilable camps – the 17.4 million ‘true believers’ in the Brexit faith versus those ‘heretics’ in the Remain camp whose ultimate ambition was to betray the cause. Yet Brexiteers rarely allowed themselves to be troubled by such discrepancies. This point has been noted throughout the literature on both Brexit and populism more generally (e.g. Hopkin and Rosamond, 2018; Suiter, 2016; Rose, 2017), with various authors citing the fact that populist movements often rely on a number of ‘bullshit’ claims
(Frankfurt, 2005) which are strongly emotive in their appeal, yet largely indifferent to the truth.
As we discuss in the final section, the strategic utilisation of such ‘bullshit’ discourse lay at the very heart of the Leave campaign, with the now famous ‘Brexit bus’ claim that the Holy Grail of British politics, the NHS, would receive an extra £350 million a week in funding in the event of a vote to Leave.
The Brexit bus campaign
These ideas about the special status of the British people, the threat from EU elites and the sacred ‘will’ expressed in the referendum, were largely metaphysical in their appeal. Indeed, one of the oft-repeated criticisms from the Remain camp was that the benefits of Brexit were rarely rationalised in any concrete terms. One of the few exceptions to this was the strategic use of social policy issues to highlight the dividend that leaving the EU could bring.
The central feature of the Leave narrative was the slogan: ‘Take back control’. The emphasis here was principally focussed around claims about the detrimental impact of immigration on public services, particularly the NHS. The centrepiece of this appeal was an infamous promotional campaign to create a direct link between the EU and social policy by emblazoning a bus with the slogan: ‘We send the EU £350 million a week. Let’s fund our NHS instead’. For emphasis, the letters ‘NHS’ were shown as the official NHS logo despite repeated warnings from the Department of Health for England not to use it on the grounds that it was ‘against our guidelines’ and risked ‘misleading and confusing the public’ (BMJ, 2016).
The NHS Brexit bus proved to be one of most controversial flashpoints of the referendum. The £350 million a week figure conflated the net and the gross components of the UK’s contribution to the EU, providing only the gross figure (itself based on an estimate) and ignoring funds received from the EU in the form of a rebate and other financial payments. According to 2015 figures from the Office of National Statistics, the UK’s net contribution to the EU was in the region of £199 million a week, a far cry from the figure presented (Morley, 2017). The claim also drew criticism from the head of the UK’s Statistics Authority, Sir David Norgrove, who said it was ‘a clear misuse of official statistics’ (BBC News, 2017), and completely ignored the fact that the NHS was itself dependent on migrant workers. As the Health Foundation makes clear, ‘migrants are an essential part of the health care workforce’ (13.3% of NHS staff in hospitals and community services in England had a non-British nationality as of June 2019, with the figure for doctors rising to 28.4%) and with persistent staffing shortages, ‘[t]he NHS needs more staff from overseas, not less’ (Alderwick and Allen, 2019). Little wonder, then, that critics claimed the Leave campaign had set out to deliberately distort the truth. As Reid (2019) observes, to many Remainers ‘the NHS bus represents the apotheosis of a campaign divorced from facts’.
Assessing the relative impact of any single part of the Brexit narrative is clearly impossible. But the significance of focusing on the claimed benefits of Brexit on social policy, and especially the NHS, should not be underestimated. The Director of the Vote Leave campaign, Dominic Cummings (2017), later maintained that ‘the £350 million / NHS argument was necessary to win’, and that ‘the connection between immigration, £350 million and the NHS
... was absolutely vital’ for their success. As he put it, the linkages drawn by the slogan provided a hotwire for connecting the experiences of national decline to Britain’s membership of the EU, stating that:
[F]or millions of people, £350m/NHS was about the economy and living standards – that’s why it was so effective. It was clearly the most effective argument not only with the crucial swing fifth but with almost every demographic ... Would we have won without £350m/NHS? All our research and the close result strongly suggests No.
The effectiveness of the NHS Brexit bus can be attributed to a number of factors. One is its sheer simplicity, consisting of just thirteen words with a score of 102.6 on the standard FleschKincaid reading ease test, indicating that it could be easily understood by the majority of 6 and 7-year olds. In addition, the claim was strategically well-framed, presenting readers with a clear binary choice and channelling debate onto the costs of EU membership (Reid, 2019). The claim itself was also highly memorable. A study conducted in 2018 by the Policy Institute, with Ipsos MORI and UK in a Changing Europe, found that 42% of respondents (and 65% of Leave supporters) still believed that the UK sent the EU £350 million a week, long after the figures had been debunked.
The attempt to link Brexit to the NHS extended far beyond the bus campaign and was one of the central features of the wider Leave strategy. The claim was placed at the very top of a list of reasons for leaving the EU on the official Vote Leave website, which maintained that: ‘We will be able to save £350 million a week. We can spend our money on our priorities like the NHS, schools and housing’.[1] The claim also featured prominently in other Vote Leave advertising. Nowhere was this more evident than on Facebook, where Vote Leave spent more than £2.7 million placing political advertisements (BBC News, 2018). Our analysis of these adverts (which were released to the Department for Media, Culture and Sport as part of an inquiry into the use of fake news) identifies 92 unique slogans in use during the referendum campaign.[2] Appeals to the NHS featured in 11.9% of these adverts, and the £350 million figure featured in 17.4%.3 Examples of these adverts include: ‘Let’s give our NHS the £350 million the EU takes every week’, ‘Spend our money on our priorities. Like the NHS’, ‘The UK sends £350 million per week to the EU, enough to build a new NHS hospital’, and ‘Imagine if we gave £350m a week to our NHS instead of the EU!’
These messages, and the slogan used in the bus campaign, were designed to appeal to nativist, in/out-group sensibilities. This can be clearly seen in the sense of ownership and exclusion they convey. The wording of the bus campaign called on the British people to spend a greater
amount of their resources (‘we’ send the EU) not on ‘the’ NHS, but on ‘our’ NHS. Similarly, the Vote Leave website and Facebook adverts claimed that ‘we’ can save £350 million a week by leaving ‘the’ EU and spend ‘our’ money on ‘our’ priorities. This process of othering – thus preserving the sanctity of the unique British ‘people’ – was an integral part of the Vote Leave messaging strategy. The term ‘we’ featured in 25% of all their Facebook advert slogans. The term ‘our’ featured in a total of 28.3%. In this way the emphasis on the NHS helped to reinforce the key themes of the wider Leave campaign, helping to create and reinforce nationally constituted in/out group dynamics.
This widespread use of the NHS/£350 million claim highlights a deeper reason for the success of the Brexit bus campaign, which is the ‘mythical’ status that the NHS holds in British national life. Famously described by the ex-Chancellor, Nigel Lawson, as ‘the closest thing the English people have to a religion’ (Spence, 2017), this is borne out consistently by polls and surveys showing the extent to which the NHS is revered by the British public. A survey by Opinium taken shortly before the referendum put the NHS top of its ‘Pride of Britain’ list, being the leading choice of 36% of respondents, far ahead of ‘British history’ (in second place, with 25%), ‘British sense of humour’ (with 23%), the monarchy and the UK’s landscape and architecture (with 22% each) (Crouch, 2016). A survey carried out by Ipsos MORI for the Health Foundation in 2017 put the NHS first in a list of services that the public wanted to be protected from austerity cuts (with 88%), far ahead of schools (56%) and care for older people (40%). Almost two thirds of respondents (64%) felt that taxes should be raised to fund the NHS and 88% felt that the NHS ought to be funded by general taxation and free at the point of use for all citizens (Health Foundation, 2017).
In this context, placing the NHS at the centre of the Brexit narrative was a shrewd political calculation – framing the NHS as the Holy Grail that could be rescued from the malign threat of the EU superstate and an influx of foreign migrants. In so doing, the campaign neatly cut into a variety of beliefs and emotions about Britain’s place in the world and its membership of the EU. As Nerlich (2017) notes, claims about the NHS ‘reinforced, exploited and entrenched various “myths” about the EU and about what it means to leave the EU’. And as Cromby (2019) observes, the NHS Brexit bus campaign worked by promoting a sense of ‘mythical thinking about Brexit’ and ‘by organising feelings of loyalty, affection, or gratitude toward the NHS, and conversely feelings of anxiety about its current state, in support of the “leave” position’.
Conclusion
The discourse used to promote the idea of Brexit marshalled a range of quasi-religious and mythical tropes and themes, promising a form of national salvation for the British people. At the heart of the Leave campaign’s promise to ‘take back control’, the NHS, and social policy more broadly, were utilised as the Holy Grail that could be rescued from the clutches of the malign forces that laid siege to Britain’s unique historical place in the world. Thus, the religious aspects of Brexit centred on a nativist process of othering, in which secularised theological concepts such as ‘sovereignty’ and the ‘nation’ were utilised to place the blame for Britain’s economic, political and social ills at the feet the European Union. This was simultaneously aligned with claims about the exceptional character of the British people, leading to subsequent appeals around the need for them to regain their leading role in global affairs. Such quasi-religious narratives worked to heighten the intense emotional fervour around Brexit and led many of its adherents to distance themselves from various facts or ‘truths’ about its potential future implications, effectively insulating claims about Brexit from any sort of rational critique. This emotional disconnect from expert advice, along with the willingness of true believers to accept various forms of ‘bullshit’, created the ideal conditions for the now famous NHS ‘lie’ on the side of the Brexit bus to play a pivotal role in securing victory for the Leave campaign.
Recent psychological research has found clear differences in reasoning between Leave and Remain supporters. Whilst the latter have been characterised by self-identification with facts, rationality and evidence, the former have been found to place far greater emphasis on appeals to emotion, nationalism and authoritarian values, all of which closely align to a religiously inspired view of the world (Zmigrod et al, 2018, 2019). These findings are borne out by opinion polls and surveys. A poll of Conservative party members carried out in June 2019 found a strong preference for Brexit, even if it led to the breakup of the country, caused significant damage to the economy or promoted the destruction of the Conservative party itself (Smith, 2019). Thus, Brexit inspired in its believers a set of goals and desires that, to many on the Remain side, appeared wildly irrational and largely divorced from political and economic realities. Nevertheless, little of this was to trouble the loyal followers of the Brexit creed, whose faith in the project remained strong throughout the intensely difficult negotiations and domestic political wrangling over the UK’s terms of exit. Indeed, not only did public support for Brexit remain remarkably solid throughout this period, levels of support for the hardest and potentially
most damaging form of ‘no deal’ Brexit increased (Kettell and Kerr, 2019). It became increasingly evident that followers of Brexit were prepared to make sacrifices – potentially to Britain’s future prosperity and unity between its nations – for the goal of retrieving its national character, most powerfully symbolised by the revered NHS.
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[2] These adverts can be found at: (https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/culture-mediaand-sport/Fake_news_evidence/Vote-Leave-50-Million-Ads.pdf URL accessed 4 March 2020. 3 Data on how frequently each advertisement was shown are not available.
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